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CASE COMMENTS
Uniform Commercial Code: Minor Repairs or
Adjustments Must Be Permitted by a Buyer
When the Seller Attempts To "Cure" a Non-
conforming Tender of Merchandise
Plaintiff's new television set had a color malfunction when
delivered by the seller. Seller unsuccessfully attempted to cor-
rect the malfunction in buyer's home and requested the buyer's
consent to take the set's chassis to his shop for inspection and
minor adjustments or repairs. The seller promised that if the
defect could not be repaired the buyer would be given a new
television set. The buyer refused to allow removal of the
chassis and demanded either a new set or the refund of his
purchase price. Seller renewed his offer to repair and the buyer
brought an action for rescission. The lower court entered
judgment for the buyer, granting rescission which entitled
buyer to the return of the purchase price plus interest and costs.
On appeal, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia re-
versed, holding that the seller had a right to attempt to "cure"
his nonconforming tender, that minor adjustments and repairs
were means of effecting such cure, and that the buyer's in-
sistence upon replacement or refund so interfered with the
seller's rights" as to defeat the buyer's remedies. Wilson v.
Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
Most early law concerned with the sale of goods included
the rigid rule that any material defect in tender of goods con-
stituted a breach of contract giving immediate rise to a cause
of action in the buyer.2 Many courts developed rationales to
mitigate this rigidity where the seller's tender, though non-
conforming, manifested no intent to repudiate the contract. One
of the major mitigating concepts developed was that of "cure,"
whereby a seller was permitted to substitute a conforming for a
nonconforming tender.3 Historically, cure permitted a seller
to liquidate encumbrances upon title,4 to repurchase and de-
1. Cf. Castille v. Champ Auto Sales, 92 So. 2d 131 (La. Ct. App.
1957). Castille involved tender of a defective title to an automobile.
The court held that the buyer's unreasonable reliance upon his "rights"
frustrated the seller's attempts to cure, that cure could have been easily
effected with the buyer's cooperation, and that the buyer's actions
barred his right to rescind.
2. See Starks v. Schlensky, 128 ll. App. 1, 4 (1906); Wiburg &
Hannah Co. v. U. P. Walling & Co., 113 S.W. 832, 834 (Ky. Ct. App. 1908).
3. For a discussion of cure under the common law see Hawkland,
Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Present and Com-
mercial Code, 46 AMUN. L. REv. 697, 703-04 (1962).
4. See, e.g., Reese v. Kapp, 82 Kan. 304, 108 P. 96 (1910); Jaenke
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liver a chattel which had been taken from the buyer by at-
tachment,5 or to substitute a totally new tender.6 However, the
Uniform Sales Act greatly inhibited the courts' use of cure as a
mitigating concept.7 The Uniform Commercial Code, now wide-
ly adopted,s has incorporated and revitalized the concept of
cure,9 but the relevant Code sections are so poorly drafted and
difficult to locate that they are seldom utilized.'"
In applying the Code to the facts in Scampoli, the court
first determined that the sections governing warranties need not
be considered, suggesting that where the seller has a right to
cure, failure to cure successfully rather than the breach of war-
ranty itself constitutes the breach of contract. The court first
determined the reasonable expectancies of the seller by exam-
ining section 2-50811 which governs the cure of nonconforming
tenders. Subsection (2) thereof specifies that where the seller
had reasonable grounds to believe that the tendered goods would
be acceptable he may cure, upon seasonable notification to the
buyer, when he is surprised by the buyer's rejection.1 2  Since
the seller in the instant case delivered the new television set
to the buyer in the manufacturer's crating without having in-
v. Taylor, 160 La. 109, 106 So. 711 (1925); Baranowski v. Linatsis, 95
N.H. 55, 57 A.2d 155 (1948).
5. See Lee v. Woods, 161 Ky. 806, 171 S.W. 389 (1914). In Lee,
the buyer's new mule was attached in foreclosure of a mortgage, and
the buyer kept the mule while the various parties fought over title.
The court held that the seller had cured the tender where he eventually
bought the mule and retendered it to buyer, the buyer having been out
of actual possession only a few days.
6. See Standard Mfg. Co. v. Slaughter, 122 fI1. App. 479 (1905)
(substitution of bond on merchandise); Mann v. Eastern Sugar & Prod.
Co., 224 Mass. 100, 138 N.E. 244 (1923).
7. See Hawkland, supra note 3, at 712. The author states that due
to the strict nature of election between rescission and damages under
the Uniform Sales Act, the courts found few instances where cure could
be fitted into the scheme of remedies.
8. With the exception of Louisiana, all of the states plus the Dis-
trict of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have now enacted the Uniform
Commercial Code. The Code is now effective in all enacting jurisdic-
tions including Arizona, Idaho, and South Carolina, where it went into
effect January 1, 1968. 22 Bus. LAw 707 (1967).
9. See Hawkland, supra note 3, at 722.
10. See Peters, Remedies for Breach, of Contracts Relating to the
Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for
Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 206, 210 (1963).
11. D.C. CODE AxN. § 28-2-508 (Supp. V, 1966).
12. Umuroim CommnvciA. CoDE § 2-508, Comment 3 emphasizes that
the further reasonable time within which the seller is allowed to cure is
a limitation upon the seller, and will be determined by the particular
circumstances at the time of rejection.
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spected it, the court concluded that the seller had no reason to
think it would be unacceptable to the buyer.13 The court stated
that the buyer would not have been greatly inconvenienced by
the seller's attempts to cure,14 and that this, coupled with the
seller's reasonable surprise at the buyer's rejection, gave the
seller a right to cure under section 2-508 (2).
The central issue in Scampoli thus became whether "re-
pairs" are included in cure under section 2-508.15 Since no
jurisdiction had previously addressed itself to construing cure
under the Code, the court turned for guidance to analogous
areas. The court stated that several courts and commentators' 6
had indicated that minor repairs were acceptable as a means of
correcting a minor breach of warranty where the buyer was not
subjected to any great inconvenience, risk, or loss.17  Thus, the
seller would not be found to have breached his contract when
his good faith efforts to avoid a breach by repairing his non-
conforming tender were thwarted by the buyer.'8 As a matter
of sound commercial policy the outcome in the instant case ap-
pears to have merit. However, the court's reasoning left much
to be desired in terms of integrated analysis of the problems
under several material sections of the Code.
In Scampoli, the parties and both the lower and appellate
courts dealt with the case as an action for rescission, giving no
13. 228 A.2d at 849.
14. Id. at 850.
15. Cure is not defined in § 2-508 or anywhere else in the Code.
It could mean the substitution of a new tender for the prior noncon-
forming tender, major repairs or adjustments, minor repairs or adjust-
ments, or just minor adjustments. Section 2-508 is included in Part 5
of the Sales Article, which contains the sections on Performance. Refer-
ence is made to § 2-508 in only one place in Part 6, which contains the
sections on the buyer's rights and duties on improper delivery, a cross
reference to point 2, and comments to § 2-605. This total failure to re-
late the seller's cure to a buyer's rejection occurs despite the little use
that the courts have made of § 2-508(1), though it is the most fre-
quently encountered under the common law and the novelty of cure as
allowed under § 2-508(2). See Hawkland, supra note 3, at 722. As
to cures under § 2-508(2), see, e.g., The Uniform Commercial Code,
37 STATE B. CAL. J. 119, 149 (1962). But see State Comment, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 26, § 2-508 (1965).
16. Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107
(1960); L. & N. Sales Co. v. Little Brown Jug, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 469
(Phila. County Ct. 1957); W. WnL= & F. HART, Foims AND ProcEDUxsS
UxDER THE UCC i[ 24.07 [4]; Hawkland, supra note 3.
17. 228 A.2d at 849.
18. Id. at 850. A decisive policy factor in this determination was
the court's cognizance that new color television sets frequently required
minor repairs to put them in working order.
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consideration to the buyer's many remedies under the Uniform
Commercial Code. Contrary to the provisions of the Uniform
Sales Act and the principles of the common law, the term "re-
scission" is no longer utilized by the Uniform Commercial Code.19
Also contrary to the Uniform Sales Act and common law, a
buyer under the Code need not make an election between reme-
dies.20 Under section 2-711(1) a rejecting or revoking buyer
may cancel the contract, recover so much of the price as he has
paid, cover, and recover damages foc nondelivery. Moreover,
section 2-711(3) allows a buyer a security interest in any
goods held plus expenses incurred due to seller's breach where
the buyer, as in Scampoli, has paid any part of the price. Fur-
ther, sections 2-715 and 2-714 set forth the buyer's rights to
incidental and consequential damages as well as to damages re-
coverable for breach respecting accepted goods.
Under the Code, a buyer may either reject a nonconforming
tender or revoke his prior acceptance of it. 21 However, since
section 2-508 is operative only where the buyer has rejected a
nonconforming tender, the Scampoli court should first have de-
termined whether the buyer had rejected, or had accepted and
subsequently revoked his acceptance of the television set.
Section 2-601 gives the buyer the options of rejection, ac-
ceptance, or partial acceptance. The buyer's rejection, which
may be for any nonconformity, must be seasonable 22 and the
buyer must avoid any exercise of ownership or failure to take
reasonable care of the goods possessed at the seller's disposi-
tion.23 It is arguable that in the instant case rejection occurred
upon buyer's demand for a new set or the return of the pur-
chase price and, although buyer retained possession of the set,
his abstention from using it 24 met the requirements of section
2-601.
Assuming rejection, the Scampoli court should then have
examined section 2-605 to determine whether or not the buyer
could rely upon the defect alleged to establish breach of the
contract. Given the facts in Scampoli, where the seller was
19. See UNiroam CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608, Comment 1.
20. Id.; see UNwIomVu SALES ACT § 69(2): "Where the buyer has
claimed and been granted a remedy in any one of these ways, no other
remedy can thereafter be granted."
21. The Code has substituted rejection. under § 2-601 for rescission
of the contract of sale, and revocation of acceptance under § 2-608 for
rescission of the sale.
22. UNWFORMV COMMaERCIAL CODE § 2-602.
23. Id.
24. 228 A.2d at 849.
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clearly and seasonably aware of the defect upon which the
buyer was relying, section 2-605 would seem to present no prob-
lem. Had notice of defect been an issue, a different procedure
would have obtained.25
Having considered these Code requirements, the court
should then have proceeded to the question of when a seller
has the privilege of substituting a conforming tender. The court
in the instant case found, in effect, that section 2-508 cure is
interposed between section 2-601 rejection and the buyer's reme-
dies under the Code.26 Thus, cure acts as a sharp check upon a
buyer's rejection of tender. Therefore, if the seller is in a posi-
tion, as in Scampoli, to persuade a court that he had reasonable
grounds for believing that his tender would be accepted, the
buyer must afford him the opportunity to substitute a con-
forming tender.2 7  Should the buyer refuse to cooperate, the
court can find that the seller has not breached his contract.28
The seller, however, has only one opportunity to substitute
conforming tender 29 and, should he fail, he has breached and
the buyer has an action for both ordinary and consequential
damages.30 Had the buyer in Scampoli been informed of the
Code provisions, he would have been cognizant of the fact that
seller had only one opportunity to cure and could have argued
that the attempt to cure the set in the buyer's home had ex-
hausted seller's right to cure by substitution.
Assuming, arguendo, that the buyer's conduct raised the
issue of acceptance,31 examination of the relevant sections of the
25. Because seller in the instant case had been unable to remove
the chassis and diagnose the malfunction prior to trial, buyer would
have had the burden of showing that the seller could not have cured
even if notified. Section 2-605(1) (a) states that if buyer fails to give
seasonable notice to seller of a defect which seller could have cured,
buyer is precluded from relying upon it to justify rejection. However,
if the defect proves to be one which the seller could not have cured
even if given seasonable notice of it, buyer may rely upon that defect
to establish breach even though unstated at the time of his rejection.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-605, Comment 1, discussing the
Code policy on notice.
26. 228 A.2d at 849. This can only be implied since nowhere in the
opinion is any section other than § 2-508 mentioned.
27. See UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-508(2).
28. See Castille v. Champ Auto Sales, 92 So. 2d 131 (La. Ct. App.
1957); Bonney v. Blaisdell, 105 Me. 121, 73 A. 811 (1909).
29. American White Bronze Co. v. Gillette, 88 Mich. 231, 50 N.W.
136 (1891).
30. UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-711.
31. The court in Scampoli assumed that the buyer's conduct con-
stituted a rejection of the nonconforming tender. Although this assump-
tion is not without merit, some of the facts give rise to a contrary infer-
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Code dealing with acceptance is required. Under section 2-606,
a buyer will be deemed to have accepted when he signifies to the
seller that he accepts the tender whether or not conforming,
fails to make an effective rejection within a reasonable time
after delivery of tender of the goods, or does any act incon-
sistent with the seller's ownership. If a buyer is deemed to
have accepted tender under section 2-606, his demand for a
refund or replacement would constitute not rejection but revo-
cation of acceptance under section 2-,308. However, unlike sec-
tion 2-601, section 2-608 does not incorporate the "rule of per-
fect tender,"32 but allows revocation only where the noncon-
formity substantially impairs the value of the thing tendered.8
Although the privilege of cure is not available under section
2-508 when the buyer revokes his acceptance,3 4 cure by a seller
is inferentially encompassed within section 2-608. When the
buyer accepts tender on the reasonable assumption that its non-
conformity will be cured, subsection 2-608(1) (a) allows a later
revocation only when the seller subsequently fails to cure. Al-
though the seller has had an opportmnity to cure prior to the
buyer's revocation under (1) (a), that privilege is not explicitly
incorporated in subsection 2-608 (1) (b). However, the official
comments to section 2-608 speak of good faith attempts at adjust-
ments between the parties and prevention of surprise, 5 as does
section 2-508.36 Thus the conclusion that cure is not available
would seem to be contrary to the underlying policy of the Code.
In addition, subsection 2-608(3) states that once a buyer has
revoked his acceptance of a tender of goods he has the same
duties with regard to them as if he had rejected them. More-
over, given the strong policy of the Code encouraging reason-
ence. In the instant case the buyer had possession of the television set
for two days before the seller's serviceman called to attempt to adjust
the set. Also, the buyer continued to exercise dominion over the goods
throughout the negotiations between the parties up to the time of ap-
peal. 228 A.2d at 849.
32. See S. WILLISTON, SALES (rev. ed. 1948), for a discussion of this
problem. See also Project-A Comparison of California Sales Law and
Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, Part II, 11 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 78 (1963), for a brief discussion of the "rule of perfect tender."
33. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE '. 2-608(1) (b).
34. Section 2-508 is applicable only when the buyer is deemed to
have rejected the nonconforming tender. See UNIrFom COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-508 (2) & Comment 2.
35. UNnORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608, Comment 5.
36. UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-508, Comment 2 states that a
primary objective of § (2) is to prevent the injustice of a surprise
rejection by the buyer. See Hawkland, supra note 3, at 722-23; Peters,
supra note 10, at 210.
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able negotiations between parties, the courts would be justified
in concluding that a seller has a right to cure when the buyer
has revoked under subsection 2-608(1) (b), as well as when the
buyer has rejected under subsection 2-601 (1) (a).
In addition to neglecting the basic Code policy calling for
the systematic application of related Code provisions, Scampoli
contains other serious problems of analysis. For example, the
use of the term "rescission" by the parties and the court could
have affected the buyer's remedies. A plaintiff who chooses
under the Code to reject or revoke his acceptance of nonconform-
ing tender can seek both restitution and consequential dam-
ages.37 A plaintiff who seeks rescission is restricted by common
law to restitution damages returning him to his original position
only.3 8 In the instant case the difference between restitution
and restitution plus consequential damages was arguably insig-
nificant, but as between two commercial entities, a nonconform-
ing tender might give rise to very substantial consequential
damages.3 9 Moreover, Scampoli demonstrates that the plain-
tiff's failure to utilize Code-procedures and language in no way
precludes the defendant from doing so in his defense. There-
fore, a buyer's attorney, seeking to maintain a strong pretrial
bargaining position vis-a-vis the seller in a nonconforming ten-
der situation, should seek those Code remedies and procedures
affording a maximum recovery and avoid asking for rescission.
In addition, the analysis of case law by the Scampoli court
was weak. Although the Scampoli court found it unnecessary
to consider the buyer's claim of breach of warranty by the seller,
it did base its definition of "cure" upon an analogy to two cases
ostensibly concerned with remedies for breach of implied war-
ranties.40 However, the sellers in both cited cases made repairs
37. Uuioim CoMMERcIAL CODE §§ 2-711, -714, -715. See text
accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
38. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 157 (1937).
39. See, e.g., Barrett Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co., 24 F.2d 329
(1st Cir. 1928) (plaintiff-buyer recovered $192,837.18 damages, includ-
ing payment for injury to the company's good will ($20,000.00) and
products that had to be destroyed because defective).
40. Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107
(1960); L. & N. Sales Co. v. Little Brown Jug, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 469
(Phila. County Ct. 1957). The court was clearly inconsistent with re-
spect to warranty in the instant case. The opinion does not reach
plaintiff's claim of a breach of warranty by the seller but, when at-
tempting to determine what cure included, the court looked to the
remedies for breach of implied warranties.
Other courts have approached the problem of the time when the
breach occurs by holding that the breach is more or less suspended
1968]
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under express warranties and in neither case was the right to
cure an issue.41
There is, however, some support for the court's conclusion
that cure includes minor repairs or adjustments. In Bonney v.
Blaisdell,42 a pre-Code case, the court held that minor defects
discovered during the trial run of a power boat did not consti-
tute a breach of contract, and that the seller had a right to
make minor repairs and adjustments as a part of cure.43  The
court in L. & N. Sales Company v. Stuski 4 noted with approval
that the seller had been given an opportunity to repair and
adjust the merchandise, holding that after prolonged attempts
by the seller to cure, the buyer could bring an action for breach
of contract.45 Moreover, in dealing with revocation of accept-
ance, the draftsmen of the Code state that it is expected that
a revocation will be sought "only after attempts at adjustment
have failed."46 Although the Code nowhere defines "cure," it
seems reasonable to believe that such attempted "adjustments"
could include minor repairs.
A more serious problem with the rationale of the instant
case is that the court's analysis suggests that buyers will be
held to a stricter observance of the Code's requirements than
will sellers. Finding that section 2-508 was applicable, the court
noted that a seller will be allowed to cure only when surprised
by the buyer's rejection if the seller is proceeding under sub-
section (2). 4 7 The official comments clearly state that where
the seller has reason to believe that his tender may be unaccept-
able, he has no statutory right to cure.48 In the instant case the
seller's expert testified that new color television sets frequently
malfunction when delivered. Thus the seller could not in fact
while the seller attempts to cure the nonconforming tender, becoming
operative only if the second tender fails. See Bonney v. Blaisdell, 105
Me. 121, 73 A. 811 (1909); L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super.
117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958).
41. In both Hall and L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, the central issue
was whether or not the seller's disclaimer of warranties was effective.
In neither case did the courts do more than merely note that the seller
had attempted to repair the merchandise, and in neither case did cure
influence the outcome.
42. 105 Me. 121, 73 A. 811 (1909).
43. Id. at 124-25, 73 A. at 812.
44. 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958).
45. Id. This remedy was contrary to that sought in Scampoli. See
note 13 supra and accompanying text.
46. UNIFoRuv COMMERcIAL CoD § 2-608, Comment 4.
47. 228 A.2d at 849.
48. UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-508, Comment 2.
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have been surprised by the defect in the buyer's set, but rather
by the buyer's refusal to allow minor repairs. The court appar-
ently found this surprise reasonable and sufficient. However,
this reasoning is faulty since Scampoli is the first case under
the Uniform Commercial Code to interpret cure to include re-
pairs. The court would have been on firmer ground had it re-
lied upon a theory of commercial custom, 49 strongly implied in
the expert's testimony and sanctioned by the Code. Moreover,
the instant case subjects buyers to the inconveniences inherent
in the acceptance of defective goods. It may be unreasonable to
expect many of today's highly sophisticated manufactured goods
to be perfect when delivered, but it seems equally unreasonable
to put the full burden of quality control upon buyers, many of
whom have neither the time nor the ability to demand perform-
ance of the dealer or manufacturer."°
The decision in Scampoli leaves several major questions un-
asked and unresolved. Notably, the court does not address it-
self to the issue of how to distinguish between minor and
substantial repairs. Seemingly, this problem of cure under the
Code is twofold: the extent of physical repair which buyer must
tolerate before the tender is so altered that it ceases to be what
was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties, and the
amount of time within which the seller may perform his one
opportunity to cure the defect.51
Cure is a very important concept in our technological soci-
ety. The draftsmen of the Code have definitely strengthened
the buyer's obligation to accept tender.5 2  Wilson v. Scampoli
49. Id. The prior course of dealings, course of performance, or
usage of trade are mentioned as examples giving rise to reasonable
expectations.
50. The public policy advanced by the courts with respect to find-
ing strict liability on the part of the sellers and manufacturers of chat-
tels would seem to be applicable here. The trend seems to be towards
maximum protection and minimum inconvenience for consumers. To
require manufacturers and dealers in Scampoli situations to assume the
major burden for quality control would seem to be consistent with that
rationale. One of the best statements of the policy in this area is to be
found in Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828
(1942). See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960).
51. See note 12 supra. It is submitted that repairs and adjust-
ments cease to be minor in nature and the buyer should be permitted
his Code remedies upon a showing that the buyer is being unreasonably
inconvenienced, regardless of the physical extent of the work being
done.
52. See also Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. R1v.
457, 473-74 (1949).
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